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INTRODUCTON
Garbage collection, transportation, and disposal have historically
been the responsibility of individual towns and cities in the United
States.' However, stringent environmental regulations, declining
landfill capacity, and the implementation of costly source reduction
and recycling programs have greatly increased the costs of waste
management borne by towns.2 For the past two decades, many local
governments have relied on "flow control" ordinances to finance their
solid waste management activities These ordinances designate
where municipal solid waste generated within the community must be
managed, stored, or disposed.4 Recently, in C & A Carbone, Inc v.
Town of Clarkstown,5 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that such
ordinances violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In
this decision, the Court misapplied the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine and thereby jeopardized the financial stability of local
governments that have relied on flow control ordinances to finance
their waste management programs.
Flow control ordinances dictate where a community's garbage
must be processed or disposed.6 By enabling a local government to
control its garbage, flow control helps the town meet its environmen-
tal goals, such as ensuring that recyclable materials are properly
1. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1697 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
2. 140 CONG. REc. H10302 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. McMillan).
3. Id. at H10301 (statement of Rep. Pallone).
4. HouSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, STATE CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT OF
MUNICIPAL SOLID WAsTE, H.R. REP. No. 738, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994) [hereinafter
HousE REPORT]. Prior to Carbone, approximately 43 states had authorized local governments
to institute flow control ordinances. Id.
5. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. CL 1677 (1994).
6. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
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separated.7 Typically, garbage processing and disposal facilities
charge a fee per ton of garbage handled, known as a "tipping" fee.8
By requiring all municipal waste to be shipped to a designated facility,
flow control guarantees a stream of revenue to that facility.9 Local
governments have relied on this revenue to fund activities such as
recycling, composting, hazardous waste collection, and construction of
state-of-the-art processing and disposal facilities."
The Carbone Court invalidated a flow control ordinance enacted
by Clarkstown, New York, under the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine." The dormant Commerce Clause applies to state and local
regulations that impact interstate commerce and that are not
authorized by Congress.'2 Two tests of the constitutionality of state
and local laws have evolved under this doctrine. First, courts apply
the strictest scrutiny to state or local regulations that benefit local
interests at the expense of out-of-state economic interests. Such
regulations are "virtually per se" invalid under this test.13 Second,
for state and local regulations that do not discriminate against
interstate interests and that only incidentally affect interstate
commerce, courts balance the burden imposed on commerce against
the benefits provided to local interests.' 4
In Carbone,5 the Court found Clarkstown's flow control
ordinance to be a protectionist measure that discriminated against
out-of-state interests and therefore applied the virtually per se invalid
test.'6 Under the strict scrutiny standard mandated by this test, the
Court ruled that the flow control ordinance was unconstitutional. 7
7. See Rufus C. Young, Municipal Landfill Fnancing: Solid Waste "Flow Control" Killed,
C930 A.L.I.-A.B.A. LAND USE INST. 213,216 (1994).
8. Idk
9. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
10. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
11. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
12. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTiTuTIONAL LAW:
SUBsTANcE AND PROCEDURE § 11.1 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter ROTUNDA &
NOwAK].
13. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,1350 (1994).
14. See, eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
15. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
16. Id. at 1683.
17. Id. at 1680.
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By so ruling, the Court greatly expanded the class of cases to which
the virtually per se invalid test applies."8
Had the Carbone Court properly applied the more appropriate
balancing test, it should have concluded that the local benefits of the
flow control regulation exceeded its incidental impact on interstate
commerce, rendering the ordinance constitutional. Flow control
ordinances benefit communities by enabling local governments to
finance costly solid waste management facilities that safely manage
garbage in compliance with federal law. 9 Moreover, in many
communities, the revenues generated from'flow control regulations
finance such critical environmental programs as recycling, composting,
household hazardous waste collection, and source reduction initia-
tives.2" Without flow control, many governments may be forced to
abandon these costly, yet environmentally-beneficial, programs. 21
The Supreme Court's decision in Carbone cripples local govern-
ments' ability to finance solid waste management activities and
jeopardizes financing already in place for existing facilities,
Congress must respond to this problem. It should override the
Supreme Court's decision in Carbone by enacting enabling legislation
that authorizes flow control regulation by municipalitiesO3
This Note first provides an overview of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. Part II reviews the Carbone decision. The impact
of this decision on the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is
analyzed in Part III, and an alternative more consistent with the
purpose of the Commerce Clause is proposed. Finally, Part IV
discusses the impact of Carbone on solid waste management activities
in the United States and recommends a federal law authorizing local
governments to implement flow control.
18. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1692 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that majority "[struck]
down an ordinance unlike anything [the Supreme Court] has ever invalidated" and "greatly
extend[ed] the Clause's dormant reach").
19. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
20. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
21. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
22. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-8.
23. The Commerce Clause affirmatively grants Congress power over interstate commerce.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Pursuant to this power, Congress may pass legislation that authorizes
local regulations that would otherwise be barred by the Commerce Clause, thus "overruling" the
Supreme Court. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.11(a).
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I. OVERVIEW OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power
... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States." 4 The
Court has defined this grant of power broadly, encompassing all
commercial intercourse that touches on interstate commerce.25
Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that congressional
power over commerce "among the several states" does not "stop at
the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into
the interior."26 '
This broad definition of congressional power, decreed by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1824, has enabled the federal government to grow
and respond to the extraordinary changes in our nation's economy
since its founding. Because of its brodd sweep, however, the
congressional commerce power often conflicts with otherwise
legitimate exercises of a state's police power. When a state regulation
conflicts with a federal statute, the Supremacy Clause makes clear
that the state regulation must give way.' However, the Constitution
is silent as to the power states have over interstate commerce in the
absence of controlling federal legislation.'
Establishing the limitations imposed on states by the Commerce
Clause has proven particularly divisive for the Court, and no clear
principles emerged until this century.29 Under the modem doctrine,
the Court has focused on the purpose of the Commerce Clause and
has sought to effectuate that purpose.30
The Commerce Clause was included in the Constitution in
reaction to the economic balkanization that had plagued the nation
under the Articles of Confederacy.3' The purpose of the clause was
to prevent states from taking partisan actions designed to gain an
economic advantage over neighboring states, as had occurred under
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).
26. Id. at 194.
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
28. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.1 ("Whether or not the commerce power is
exclusive or to what extent concurrent state regulation may coexist in the absence of an
articulated Congressional judgment is not textually demonstrable.").
29. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.1.
30. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.1.
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 191-92 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961); TIM FEDERALIST No. 42, at 304-306 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
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the Articles. 2 The Framers were concerned that such biased actions
would "nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate
in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity."33 In his Federalist
No. 42, James Madison wrote of his particular concern that commer-
cial states, motivated by "immediate and immoderate gain," would
seek to "collect revenue from their noncommercial neighbors by
imposing tariffs on trade through their lands.' This illustrates that
the Framers viewed federal "superintending authority over the
reciprocal trade of confederated States" as a "necessity."35
Under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the Supreme
Court has sought to prevent the factionalism the Framers strove to
impede when they included the Commerce Clause in the Constitution.
Thus, the Court has been particularly critical of state regulations that
benefit the enacting state to the detriment of other states.36
This critical approach has led the Court to adopt two tests of the
validity of a state regulation affecting interstate commerce. State
regulations that do not discriminate against interstate interests and
that only incidentally affect interstate commerce are valid unless "the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." 37  In contrast, state regulations that
discriminate against interstate commerce are "virtually per se"
invalid.3" In this context, discrimination means "differential treat-
ment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter., 39
The first step of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
therefore, is to determine whether the statute is discriminatory. In
making this determination, the Court considers whether a statute is
"basically a protectionist measure" or is a law directed to legitimate
local concerns with only incidental effects upon interstate com-
merce.4 The Court looks to both the purpose and the effects of the
state legislation.4' To qualify for consideration under the more
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 305 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 305-306.
35. d. at 306.
36. See, eg., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
37 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U:S. 137, 142 (1970).
38. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994).
39. Id.
40. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
41. Id. at 623.
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flexible balancing test, the questioned state activity must credibly
advance legitimate local interests and must not patently discriminate
against interstate trade.42
The balancing test for nondiscriminatory state regulations
recognizes that legitimate exercises of the state's police power may
unavoidably create incidental burdens on .interstate commerce.43
Such regulations are valid unless their local benefit is clearly exceeded
by the burden on interstate commerce.44 In evaluating such regula-
tions under this test, the Court considers the nature of the burden on
interstate commerce,45 the nature of the local interest involved, and
whether an equally effective alternative with, a lesser impact on
interstate commerce exists. 46
In contrast, statutes that clearly discriminate against out-of-state
interests must pass the virtually per se invalid test.47 Under this test,
the discriminatory regulation must ber invalidated unless it advances
a legitimate local purpose unrelated to economic protectionism that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives.' Such regulations must undergo the "strictest scrutiny"
by the Court.49  Indeed, facial discrimination against out-of-state
economic interests may itself be fatal.5°
The Court has advanced two justifications for this virtually per se
invalid test. First, economic protectionism is not a valid local purpose
justifying discriminatory regulations.5 This justification is supported
by the underlying .purposes of the Commerce Clause-to create a
national economy and to prevent economic balkanization of the
nation.52 When discrimination exists, therefore, the Court is suspi-
42. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2014 n.5 (1992) (citing
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624).
43. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621.
44. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
45. Id. at 144.
46. Id. at 142.,
47. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992).
48. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. RoTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 12, § 11.8; see, eg., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1928) (holding states do not have power to prevent interstate
shipment of goods simply because goods are needed locally).
52. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
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cious of any purported local purpose and imposes the strictest
scrutiny.53
The Court's second justification for the virtually per se invalid
test is that there has been no true legislative weighing of all the
benefits and costs of the statute to justify the Court's usual deference
to the judgment of a legislature.54 Out-of-state interests are forced
to bear the burden of local discriminatory legislation, yet those
interests were not represented in the enacting state's political
processes. Due to the absence of this political check, the Court has
applied the strictest scrutiny to discriminatory regulations.
Clearly, then, the Court's choice between applying the balancing
test or the virtually per se invalid test frequently determines the
outcome of dormant Commerce Clause cases. State or local
regulations that face the virtually per se test must clear a very high
hurdle and are often invalidated. The balancing test represents a
lower standard and is easier to satisfy. The ability of a state or
locality to convince the Court to apply the balancing test, then, is
often the deciding factor in defending a regulation from a dormant
Commerce Clause attack.
II. THE CARBONE DECISION
The Supreme Court most recently applied the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine in C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown.55
Finding that a Clarkstown flow control ordinance discriminated
against out-of-state interests, the Court applied the virtually per se
invalid test and held that the ordinance violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.5 6 The flow control ordinance at issue in Carbone
typifies those enacted in other states and municipalities across the
United States.' This part describes the origins of the Clarkstown
dispute and the Supreme Court's decision.
53. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2014 (1992).
54. See, eg., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945);
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.11.
55. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
56. Id at 1680.
57. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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A. Background of the Dispute
From the 1950's until 1990, Clarkstown owned its own solid waste
landfill.5" Environmental concerns regarding this landfill led to
litigation brought by the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC). The town and the DEC entered into a consent
decree, which required the town to close its landfill and to build a
transfer station capable of properly processing and shipping the town's
solid waste.59
Clarkstown then entered into a contract with Clarkstown
Recycling Center, Inc., to build a transfer facility and operate it for
-five years, after which the town would purchase the facility for one
dollar.' The facility was designed to accommodate the quantity of
waste generated within Clarkstown. To induce the operator to
commit capital to the project, the town authorized a tipping fee of $81
per ton and guaranteed the facility a minimum waste flow of 120,000
tons per year.61 The town was obligated to compensate the operator
for any shortfall in waste tonnage at the regular tipping fee rate.62
As part of Clarkstown's overall plan to ensure proper handling of its
solid waste and to enable the town to meet its guaranteed tonnage to
the operator, Clarkstown enacted a flow control ordinance, Local Law
9.63
The effect of Local Law 9 was to require all waste within.
Clarkstown to proceed at some point through the town's transfer
station. Any person and any permitted recycling center were allowed
to separate recyclables from the town's solid waste and sell such
recyclables anywhere they chose.6" The non-recyclable remainder,
58. Respondent's Brief at 8, Carbone (No. 92-1402).
59. IL"
60. Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
61. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
62. Id.
63. Respondent's Brief at 9, Carbone (No. 92-1402). Section 3(C) of Local Law 9 provides
that
[a]ll acceptable waste generated within the territorial limits of the Town of Clarkstown
is to be transported and delivered to the Town of Clarkstown solid waste facility...
or to ... recycling centers. ... As to acceptable waste brought to said recycling
facilities, the unrecycled residue shall be disposed of at a solid wasti facility operated
by the Town of Clarkstown.
Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown, New York, § 3(C), reprinted in Carbone,
114 S. Ct. at 1686.
64. Respondent's Brief at 9, Carbone (No. 92-1402).
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however, had to be delivered to the Clarkstown transfer station,6 5
and the normal tipping fee of $81 per ton still applied, even though
the waste had already been sorted. The Clarkstown facility also
accepted waste from out-of-town and out-of-state sources,6 which
was subject to the same tipping fee.
C & A Carbone was a local Clarkstown recycler holding a special
recycling center permit.67 Under Local Law 9, C & A Carbone was
authorized to receive Clarkstown's solid waste for the purpose of
separating and selling any recyclables. Local Law 9 required C & A
Carbone to deliver the non-recyclable residue to the town's transfer
station.' C & A Carbone asserted that, rather than pay the $81 per
ton tipping fee charged by the. Clarkstown transfer station, it could
dispose of its non-recyclable residue elsewhere for.$70 per ton.69
In 1991, Clarkstown officials discovered that C & A Carbone was
illegally shipping non-recyclable residue out of town when a tractor-
trailer owned by C & A Carbone and containing 46,440 pounds of
solid waste was involved in a traffic accident.7 ° A police investiga-
"tion revealed that the load included non-recyclable garbage originat-
ing from Clarkstown, a neighboring town, and New Jersey.71 Police
subsequently observed other tractor-trailers carrying non-recyclable
residue leaving the C & A Carbone site, headed for locations in
Illinois, Indiana, West Virginia, and Florida.72
Clarkstown commenced proceedings against C & A Carbone in
New York Supreme Court, seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions prohibiting violations of Local Law 9.73 The company
contended that the flow control ordinance violated the Commerce
65. Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown, New York, § 3(C), reprinted in
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1686.
66. Respondent's Brief at 10, Carbone (No. 92-1402).
67. Initially, Clarkstown refused to issue a recycling permit to C & A Carbone. The town
subsequently issued the permit pursuant to a New York Supreme Court order dated February
27, 1991. Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 684 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992). In 1991, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation threatened to revoke
C & A Carbone's permit upon finding permit violations. Respondent's Brief at 10, Carbone
(No. 92-1402).
68. Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown, New York, § 3(C), reprinted in
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1686.
69. Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
70. Id, at 684.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Clause.74 The New York Supreme Court granted summary judgment
in favor of the town, finding Local Law 9 valid.75 On appeal by C
& A Carbone, the Appellate Division affirmed.7 6 C & A Carbone
then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.'
B. The Majority Opinion
In a five to three decision, with one concurrence, the Supreme
Court declared Local Law'9 invalid because it discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.78 The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, held that the flow
control ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce'on its
face and was therefore subject to the virtually per se invalid test.79
The majority found that, although the immediate effect of Local
Law 9 was local, its economic effects reached across state lines.'
First, the ordinance required local recyclers such as Carbone to pay
the higher tipping rate charged by the Clarkstown facility. Since
Carbone also processed waste from out of state, the higher tipping fee
increased the cost for Carbone's out-of-state customers to dispose of
their waste.' Second, because the ordinance prevented all but the
Clarkstown transfer station from processing Clarkstown's solid waste,
the ordinance deprived out-of-state interests of access to the local
market for solid waste processing.' Justice Kennedy found these
74. Id.
75. Id C & A Carbone instituted a separate action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York for injunctive relief and damages. The District Court
dismissed C & A Carbone's antitrust claims but preliminarily enjoined the town from enforcing
Local Law 9 as to out-of-town waste, finding it likely that this provision violated the Commerce
Clause. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 770 F. Supp. 848, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Following the New York Supreme Court's summary judgment order, the federal court dissolved
its injunction. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1681 (1994).
76. Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, 688 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
77. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993).
78. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1680 (1994).
79. Id. at 1683.
80. Id. at 1681.
81. Id. The Court failed to recognize that an increase in the fees C & A Carbone charged
its customers due to Clarkstown's higher tipping fees might, if above market price, result in
Carbone's out-of-state customers finding a different recycler rather than paying the higher
Carbone rates.
82. Id.
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two economic effects to be "more than enough to bring the Clarks-
town ordinance within the purview of the Commerce Clause."'
According to the majority, these two economic effects of Local
Law 9 disadvantaged interstate commerce in favor of local business,
making the ordinance a protectionist measure.' The majority
opinion described the flow control ordinance as "hoard[ing] solid
waste ... for the benefit of the preferred processing facility."'
According to Justice Kennedy, the fact that the ordinance favored
only one preferred facility rather than local interests in general "just
makes the protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute.""
After finding that Clarkstown's flow control ordinance discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce on its face, the majority applied the
virtually per se invalid test, strictly scrutinizing the ordinance to
determine if any alternative means existed to advance the town's
legitimate local interests.' The majority found that such alternatives
were available.
The majority rejected arguments that the flow control ordinance
was "necessary to ensure the safe handling and proper treatment of
solid waste."'  Justice Kennedy suggested that the town could
achieve these goals by enacting uniform safety regulations, which
would allow facilities such as Carbone to process local waste while
ensuring the town's health and safety.89 Furthermore, using a flow
control ordinance to direct the town's garbage away from out-of-town
landfills that the town deemed harmful to the environment would
impermissibly extend the "town's police power beyond its jurisdiction-
al bounds."' Local governments may not use their regulatory power
to attach restrictions on interstate commerce. 91
Justice Kennedy suggested that Clarkstown's true purpose for
enacting Local Law 9 was to finance its transfer station.' The Court
declared that such a financial motive alone cannot justify a regulation
83. Id. at 1681.
84. Id. at 1682.
85. Id. at 1683.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)).
92. Id. at 1684.
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that discriminates against interstate commerce.93 Moreover, the
Court determined that the town could have used an alternative
scheme, such as subsidizing the facility through general tax revenues
or municipal bonds, to ensure the financial viability of its transfer
station without discriminating against interstate commerce?4 Having
found viable alternatives to Clarkstown's protectionist flow control
ordinance, the Court declared Local Law 9 unconstitutional.95
C. The Concurrence
Justice O'Connor delivered a concurring opinion in Carbone in
which she ultimately agreed with the majority's conclusion that
Clarkstown's Local Law 9 violated the Commerce Clause.96 In her
view, however, the flow control ordinance should have been evaluated
under the balancing test rather than the virtually per se invalid test
applied by the majority.9
Justice O'Connor determined that the virtually per se invalid test
did not apply to Local Law 9 because the ordinance did not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce.98 She pointed out that Clarks-
town's flow control ordinance, unlike other regulations invalidated by
the Court under the Commerce Clause, did not discriminate on the
basis of geographic origin.9  Local Law 9 did not treat in-town
interests as a group more favorably than out-of-town or out-of-state
economic interests.34 ° Rather, in-town processors, such as C & A
Carbone, and out-of-town processors were equally denied access to
the local solid waste processing market; in-state and out-of-state
interests were treated evenhandedly.1
Applying the balancing test explained in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,"~ Justice O'Connor nonetheless found the flow control ordi-
nance unconstitutionally imposed an incidental burden on interstate
commerce that clearly exceeded the local benefits. 3  Justice
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1680.
96. Id. at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Ld. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 1688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
103. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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O'Connor identified two local interests furthered by the flow control
ordinance, and agreed with the majority that both these interests
could have been achieved through alternative means with less impact
on interstate commerce.'( 4
First, O'Connor found that the town had a legitimate interest in
ensuring proper disposal of its solid waste. 05 The town could have
protected this interest without discriminating against interstate
commerce, however, by requiring all processors to comply with
specific health and safety standards.' 6
Second, O'Connor found that LocalLaw 9 was enacted to further
the town's interest. in securing the financial viability of its transfer
station. However, the town could have achieved this goal with less
impact on interstate commerce through the use of general tax
revenues or municipal bonds."°
Finally, Justice O'Connor found the incidental effect on interstate
commerce of Clarkstown's flow control ordinance to be excessive. In
so concluding, she .considered not just the impact of Clarkstown's
ordinance, but also the collective impact of the proliferation of flow
control ordinances enacted throughout the country." , Such a
proliferation, she. determined, would severely impair the free
movement of waste in the stream of commerce."°  Especially
problematic would be conflicts among flow control ordinances of
different localities, which might make it impossible for a recycler such
as C & A Carbone to comply with all applicable legislation.1
Justice O'Connor concluded that such "pervasive flow control would
result in the type of balkanization the [Commerce] Clause is primarily
intended to prevent." ''
D. The Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Souter, also concluded that the
balancing test, rather than the virtually per se invalid test, should be
applied to Clarkstown's Local Law 9."' Unlike Justice O'Connor,
104. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id., (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. (O'Connor, ., concurring).
110. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1698-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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however, Justice Souter found that the legitimate local' interests
furthered by the flow control ordinance outweighed any incidental
impacts on interstate commerce."1
The dissent identified two characteristics -of the Clarkstown
ordinance that precluded application of the virtually per se invalid
test. Justice Souter found that each of these factors operated to bring
the ordinance "outside that class of tariff or protectionist measures
that the Commerce Clause has traditionally been thought to bar
States from enacting against each other.""' 4
First, the law did not differentiate between all local providers of
a service and all out-of-town providers, but rather between one local
provider and all other providers, regardless of their location."' This
distinguished Clarkstown's ordinance from other ordinances held
invalid. by the Court, which favored in-town interests as a class over
out-of-state interests based on geographic criteria."' Unlike the
Clarkstown ordinance, these other ordinances were struck down
because they exemplified "the economic protectionism the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence aims to prevent."" 7 Although the
Clarkstown ordinance was anti-competitive, the dissenting justices
asserted it was not a protectionist measure."'
Justice Souter responded to the majority's claim that favoring one
local facility is discriminatory."9 He acknowledged that the statute
created a monopoly, but pointed out that this monopolistic effect had
no constitutional significance.' The prohibition against monopolies
arises from statutes, not from the Constitution.'2' As Justice Souter
explained, "[t]he only right to compete that [the Commerce Clause]
protects is the right to compete on terms independent of one'slocation. '' 2
The second characteristic that the dissent argued rendered the
virtually per se test inapplicable to Local Law 9 is that the one local
entity favored under the ordinance is essentially a municipally-owned
113. See id at 1699-1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1692 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1683.
120. Id. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).,
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facility." The transfer station was built and administered under
contract with the town of Clarkstown, and the town was to take
complete ownership of the facility in five years.24
Justice Souter distinguished laws favoring local private interests,
which rarely serve a purpose other than economic protectionism, from
laws favoring a governmental entity.'2 The government, in contrast
to private economic actors, enters the market to further the public
interest. 26  Consequently, laws favoring such a public actor are
much more likely to serve a public interest independent of naked
protectionism.'2 - Because the justification for subjecting clearly
discriminatory regulations to the virtually per se invalid test is the
near certainty that such laws serve no legitimate, nonprotectionist
purpose, laws favoring a governmental entity, for which a valid public
interest can be presumed, should be subjected instead to the less
searching balancing test."2
The dissent concluded that, because these two characteristics
militate against finding the ordinance discriminatory, the balancing
test should be employed to weigh the law's incidental burdens on
interstate commerce against the local benefits it confers. 29  In
performing this balancing, the dissent considered "the nature of the
burden on interstate commerce, the nature of the, local interest, and
the availability of alternative methods for advancing the local interest
without hindering the national one."'130
The dissent found virtually no burden imposed on interstate
commerce by the Clarkstown ordinance. Rather, the dissent asserted
that any burden imposed by Local Law 9 fell only on Clarkstown's
residents, who were forced to pay higher tipping fees.' Justice
Souter pointed out that the record failed to identify any out-of-state
interest harmed by Local Law 9 or any disruption in the flow of
Clarkstown garbage to out-of-state landfills. Any loss of business
123. Md at 1696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
124. Ik- at 1680.
125. ld. at 1697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
129. Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142,
145 (1970)).
131. Id. at 1700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
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by C & A Carbone or other Clarkstown businesses did not offend the
Commerce Clause and was justified by the benefits of the ordi-
nance.1M
In addition to finding only a minimal burden imposed by the
ordinance, the dissent concluded that Local Law 9 furthered substan-
tial local interests. 35 Unlike the majority, the dissent determined
that ensuring the financial viability of the transfer station was a
considerable and legitimate local interest.136 Justice Souter empha-
sized the need for assuring efficient and safe waste removal as well as
the significant capital investment required to establish a transfer
station.137 He also recognized the limitations on a municipality's
ability to finance such expenditures through debt or general tax
revenues. 38  Justice Souter also pointed out an additional benefit
not acknowledged by the majority: by allocating the burden of
financing the transfer station among Clarkstown residenfs based on
the quantity of waste each resident generated, the ordinance provided
a direct and significant incentive for reducing waste generation.139
Justice Souter found that the alternatives relied upon by the
majority and the concurrence in striking down this ordinance were
inadequate. As mentioned above, he questioned the ability of
municipalities to finance solid waste facilities through general tax
revenues or debt.' Furthermore, he asserted that such alternatives
would themselves produce burdens on commerce equivalent to any
produced by the flow control ordinance.'41 At the same time, these
alternatives would fail to provide an incentive for reducing waste
generation, one of the benefits of Local Law 9.1' Thus, under the
balancing test, the dissent concluded that Local Law 9 should
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the dormant Commerce
Clause. 43
133. Id. at 1701 (Souter, ., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 1701-02 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
142. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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III. CRITIQUE OF CARBONE
In concluding that the Clarkstown flow control ordinance violated
the Commerce Clause, the Carbone Court applied the virtually per se
invalid test instead of the more appropriate balancing test. In so
doing, the Court greatly expanded the use of the virtually per se
invalid test and departed from the purpose of the Commerce
Clause-preventing states from enacting predatory protectionist
measures. The ultimate result of this expansion will be the invalida-
tion of legitimate and important local health and safety regulations
that only incidentally impact interstate commerce.
Rather than finding the Clarkstown ordinance unconstitutional
under the virtually per se invalid test, the.Court should have weighed
the importance of the legitimate governmental objectives achieved by
the law against its burden on interstate commerce. Under this more
flexible test, Clarkstown's Local Law 9 should have been found
constitutional. The following discussion demonstrates the inapplicabil-
ity of the virtually per se invalid test to the Clarkstown ordinance and
applies the more appropriate balancing test.
A. The Inapplicability of the Virtually Per Se Test To Carbone
Neither of the two factors the Court has recognized as justifying
use of the virtually per se invalid test are present in Carbone.'
First, the ordinance is not a protectionist measure. Second, the costs
of the ordinance are not imposed on unrepresented, out-of-state
interests to the benefit of local interests. -Because neither justification
is present, Carbone represents an unwarranted expansion of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, an expansion that significantly
departs from the purpose of the Commerce Clause itself.
First, Clarkstown's flow control ordinance is not a protectionist
measure because it does not discriminate against out-of-state
economic interests. This is evidenced by the lack of any geographic
distinctions in the ordinance, both facially and as applied. As the
dissent points out, all statutes mandating that goods be processed
locally, which the Court has previously held invalid, treated local and
out-of-state companies differently based solely on their geographic
location. 4 In contrast, Local Law 9 equally disadvantages all waste
144. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
145. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1694 (Souter, ., dissenting).
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processors, with the exception of the town's one designated transfer
station.' 6 The fact that C & A Carbone, Inc., is a recycling center
located in Clarkstown demonstrates that the ordinance disadvantaged
local companies.
The majority asserted that the fact that the ordinance favors a
single local facility "just makes the protectionist effect of the
ordinance more acute."147  In making this assertion, however, the
Court misapprehends the term "protectionist" as well as the purpose
of the Commerce Clause.
As the dissent persuasively points out, the Commerce Clause is
not a free trade measure."4 Rather, the Commerce Clause is
concerned with partisan measures by one state to gain economic
advantage over its neighbors.149 The monopolistic nature of Local
Law 9, without more, does not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.' Since Clarkstown's ordinance sought no such economic
advantage, it should not trigger the application of the rigorous
virtually per se invalid test under the dormant Commerce Clause.The purpose of the Clarkstown law is also not protectionist.
Clarkstown enacted the law pursuant to a consent decree with the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, which
required the town to build a transfer station capable of properly
processing and shipping the town's solid waste. 1' Local Law 9 was
passed'to finance this transfer station."'
Additionally, providing for the safe handling of garbage is a
traditional local governmental purpose recognized throughout the
history of this country. 3 Congress implicitly recognized the author-
ity of local governments over their waste when it enacted Subchapter
IV of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
governing "State or Regional Solid Waste Plans."'54  The stated
objectives of this subchapter include achieving environmentally sound
146. Id. at 1695-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1683.
148. Id. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. See TnE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
150. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Respondent's Brief at 8, Carbone (No. 92-1402). The decree settled charges brought
against the town for environmental violations stemming from the town's landfill, which the
Clarkstown transfer station replaces. Id.
152. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
153. 'Id at 1697 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1988).
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disposal of solid waste through federal assistance to the states.155
This subchapter also encourages states to develop solid waste
management plans,5 6 which in turn must ensure that local govern-
ments are not prohibited from "entering into long-term contracts for
the supply of solid waste to resource recovery facilities.... [or] for the
operation of such facilities.' 5 7 These provisions of RCRA demon-
strate that Congress contemplated that state and local governments
would have authority to govern solid waste management in their
regions."'
As to the Court's second justification for application of the
virtually per se invalid test, here the regulation's costs are not
imposed on unrepresented, out-of-state interests. Clarkstown's
residents bear the full cost of the ordinance by paying higher tipping
fees for their garbage. 59  Because the costs and benefits of Local
Law 9 are borne by local residents, the town's legislative process
ensures that the law's costs are justified by the resulting benefit to the
public welfare. The ordinance should therefore be entitled to the
customary deference courts give to legislative decisions."6 The
balancing test inherently provides this deference.
The heightened scrutiny provided under the virtually per se
invalid test is justified only when the costs of a regulation are borne
by unrepresented, out-of-state interests.'6' The local legislature may
fail to consider such external costs and therefore not fully evaluate the
value of the enactment. Under such circumstances, courts impose the
.strictest scrutiny to ensure that the rights of these out-of-state'
interests have not been violated. 6Z By applying heightened scrutiny
to the Clarkstown ordinance, however, the Court failed to recognize
155. Id. § 6941.
156. Id. § 6943.
157. Id. § 6943(a)(5).
158. Amicus argued that these provisions of RCRA authorize local flow control ordinances,
thus making the dormant Commerce Clause arguments inoperative. Although not specifically
addressed in the majority opinion, the Court implicitly rejected this argument by analyzing the
ordinance under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691-1692
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex reL Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,767 n.2 (1945);
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1689 (O'Connor, J., concurring); ROTUNDA & NOWAY, supra note 12,
§ 11.11.
161. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978);
see ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.11.
162. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 12, § 11.11.
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that both the costs and benefits of Local Law 9 were local. In this
misapplication, the Court compromised both legislative discretion and
federalist principles.
Prior to Carbone, the virtually per se invalid test applied only to
state laws that clearly discriminated against out-of-state economic
interests. 63 The attenuated definition of "discrimination" used by
the Court in Carbone greatly expands the application of this test. The
,shortcoming of this expanded test is that it prevents courts from
considering the import of the local governmental purpose involved or
the degree of impact on interstate commerce. Vital, non-protectionist
local legislation that has only an inconsequential impact on interstate
commerce may therefore be held invalid under the Court's logic in
Carbone.
B. Application of the Balancing Test To Carbone
As recognized by the concurrence and the dissent, the appropri-
ate test for evaluating the constitutionality of the, Clarkstown
ordinance is the balancing test articulated by the Court in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.64 This test applies to statutes that do not
discriminate against out-of-state economic interests and only
incidentally affect interstate commerce.' 65 Such laws are considered
valid unless their burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive"
in relation to their local benefits."6  In applying this test, courts
must consider the nature of the burden on interstate commerce, 167
the nature of the local interest involved, and whether an equally
effective alternative with a. lesser impact on interstate commerce
exists."6 As the dissent recognized, consideration of these charac-
teristics of Clarkstown's flow control ordinance reveals that the
ordinance does not violate the Commerce Clause.6
The extent of the burden placed on interstate commerce by Local
Law 9 is minimal. As Justice Kennedy explained, "[t]he immediate
effect of the ordinance is to direct local transport of solid waste to a
163. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan, 112 S. Ct. 2019,2023-24 (1992).
164. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
165. See id at 142.
166. Id.
167. See id at 145.
168. Id. at 142.
169. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1692-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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designated site within the local jurisdiction."" Because local
recyclers such as C & A Carbone are forced to pay the higher tipping
fees charged by the Clarkstown transfer station, they may have to
increase their prices'. or else. suffer lower profits. If private
recycling centers choose to increase prices in response to the higher
tipping fees, they may lose customers to less expensive competitors
who do not face Clarkstown's high tipping fee. Thus, the result of the
Clarkstown ordinance may well be an increase in business to out-of-
state competitors. In this respect, the majority's concerns about the
negative impact Local Law 9 would have on interstate commerce
appear to be unfounded.
As Justice Souter emphasized in his dissenting opinion, no
evidence was presented that showed that any harm was done to any
out-of-state interests by Local Law 9.172 Under this ordinance, the
Clarkstown transfer station may send the waste it collects to any
facility for treatment or disposal, and the transfer station does in fact
send its solid waste to landfills in other states.'73 Thus, the inter-
state flow of solid waste cannot be said to be hampered by the
ordinance. These circumstances demonstrate that Clarkstown's flow
control ordinance only minimally burdens interstate commerce.
At the same time, Local Law 9 furthers legitimate and substantial
local governmental interests. The ordinance enabled Clarkstown to
build and operate a transfer station, as the town was required to do
by order of the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation.' 4 The Clarkstown transfer station plays an important
role in ensuring the safe handling of the town's solid waste, a
traditional and legitimate local governmental purpose.75  The
transfer station also ensures that recyclable materials are separated
from the waste stream and safely recycled, furthering an important
national policy established by Congress in RCRA.176 Because the
station is financed through tipping fees under Clarkstown's ordinance,
the price of the station is equitably borne by those who use it in
proportion to their usage. This financing mechanism provides a
170. Id. at 1681.
171. Id
172. Id. at 1700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1680.
175. Id. at 1697 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1988).
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significant incentive for *the town's residents to reduce their waste
generation, thereby encouraging efficient use of resources, conserving
diminishing landfill space, and preventing pollution, all of which are
legitimate local interests.
Finally, no equally effective alternatives exist that would'have a
lesser impact on interstate commerce, despite the majority's finding
to the contrary. Financing the transfer station through general tax
revenues, as the Carbone Court suggests,'" is not a viable alterna-
tive for two reasons. First, a tax increase would not achieve the
pollution prevention objectives furthered by the flow control
ordinance. Second, a general tax increase lacks the equity achieved
by having local residents ay for the services they consume.
The Court's other suggested financing alternative is that
Clarkstown issue municipal bonds to finance its transfer station.17 1
In practice, however, flow control regulations are often required by
lenders as a prerequisite to obtaining such bond financing, as the
bonds are otherwise considered too risky.'79 Flow control ordinanc-
es assure an adequate quantity of waste for a solid waste management
facility to maintain economic viability."8 This minimum quantity is
required because of the huge cost of environmental controls at such
facilities and economies of scale in operating them.
Local Law 9 provides an effective and efficient means of ensuring
safe and effective waste handling, recycling, and pollution prevention.
The ordinance is a creative solution to Clarkstown's environmental
problems and to the often enormous cost of local solid waste
management. The Court should not apply the dormant Commerce
Clause to squelch such innovative public policies.
IV. A WAKE-UP CALL To CONGRESS
The Carbone decision threatens to create a financial crisis for
many local governments. 8' These communities have collectively
177. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1684.
178. Id.
179. See Joan Biskupic, Waste Hauling Rules Dumped; High Court Opinion Imperils
Municipally Funded Disoosal Plants, WASHNGTON POST, May 17, 1994, at As.
180. See, eg., Timothy Phelps, High Court Ruling on Trash; It Throws Out Local Laws That
Ban Export Of Garbage, NEWSDAY, May 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers
File (discussing Carbone's impact on municipal solid waste incinerators, which demand a
continuous source of fuel to operate efficiently and generate a reliable source of electricity).
181. See Nancy Peterson, Trash-Disposal Case Is Ready to Go to Trial, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 11, 1994, at MD1, MD6-d.
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invested billions of dollars in solid waste management facilities, often
relying on flow control regulations to provide adequate revenue to
service the debt they incur in building these facilities." 2  Carbone
places these financing arrangements, and the local governments that
have relied on them, in jeopardy.'13 Congress may solve this
problem, however, by quickly enacting specific legislation authorizing
localities to implement flow control ordinances."8
Local governments have traditionally been responsible for the
safe handling of their communities' solid waste."8 As a result of
greater federal regulation, the costs of environmentally-sound solid
waste management have increased substantially in recent years.
At the same time, currently available landfill space meeting environ-
mental standards is limited. Under these circumstances, flow control
provides an important tool for financing solid waste management.
Towns that have used flow control to finance solid waste
* management facilities or have undertaken financial obligations relying
on future flow control authority now face financial distress because of
.Carbone." Many local governments have used flow control regula-
tions to guarantee adequate revenue to service municipal bonds.
Without this guarantee, many municipalities would be unable to issue
bonds for construction of solid waste facilities."8 9
Flow control ordinances have also been enacted by many local
governments that have signed long-term "put-or-pay" contracts with
waste disposal facilities.' 9 These contracts require the towns to pay
the facility the cost of handling a minimum quantity of waste, whether
or not that quantity is actually delivered to the facility.'9' These
182. Id. at MD6-d (paraphrasing Diane Shea of the National Association of Counties); 140
CONG. REc. H10299 (daily ed. Sept 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Swift).
183. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. - "
184. ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 12, § 11.11; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
185. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7; 140 CONG. REC. H10298 (daily ed. Sept. 29,1994)
(statement of Rep. Swift).
186. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7; 140 CONG. REc. H10298 (daily ed. Sept. 29,1994)
(statement of Rep. Swift).
187. Indeed, an estimated $14 billion in outstanding municipal bonds is jeopardized as a
result of Carbone. 140 CONG. REc. H10299 (daily ed. Sept. 29,1994) (statement of Rep. Swift).
188. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
189. Biskupic, supra note 179, at A8.
190. 140 CONG. REc. H10300 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Snowe). In the
state of Maine alone, 160 municipalities have signed such agreements with the understanding
that they would be able to utilize flow control to meet their obligations. Id.
191. Id.
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towns now "face the prospect of having to meet expensive contractual
obligations without having the regulatory authority to guarantee
delivery of the required amount of waste."''
In addition to providing financial support for state-of-the-art solid
waste handling and disposal, flow control is a critical tool for
integrated waste management. In RCRA, Congress encouraged states
to develop comprehensive solid waste management plans.'93 These
integrated plans often "involve components, such as curbside recycling
and household hazardous waste pickup, that are not economically self-
sustaining."' 94 Towns use the guaranteed revenues provided by flow
control authority to finance these expensive and unprofitable public
services.195
One example of an integrated waste management plan is that of
Onondaga County, California. There, the town combines a $96 per
ton tipping fee with flow control to finance its waste management
activities. Of the $96, $40 covers the cost of solid waste dispos-
al."9 The remaining $56 per ton, 60% of the tipping fee, is used to
finance programs such as recycling, composting, source reduction, and
environmental education.' Without. flow control, the county could
not collect the high tipping fee that finances its integrated waste
management program.'" As Diane Shea of the National Associa-
tion of Counties explained, "If you can't control the part of the
system that makes money, you can't do the rest such as recycling ....
[F]low control is the linchpin for the entire solid-waste system."2
Congress has enacted extensive environmental legislation that has
pushed up the cost of solid waste management, leaving implementa-
tion to states and local governments.2 l By authorizing flow control,
Congress would give back to states and local governments the tool
they need to finance these costly environmental protections.
192. Id
193. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
194. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
195. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
196. HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., FLOW CONTROL COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
BACKGROUND INFORMATION, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. tab 6 (1994).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. This is because Onondaga County would have to compete with private landfills'such as
that used by Orange County, which charges a tipping fee of $60 per ton. See iL
200. Petersen, supra note 181, at MD6-d.
201. See 140 CONG. REC. H10298 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Swift).
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During the 103d Congress, the House passed a bill, House Bill
4683, that would have amended RCRA °3 specifically to autho-
rize state control over the transportation, management, and disposal
of municipal solid waste.' The amendment would have
grandfathered in all existing flow control ordinances, 5 thus protect-
ing communities from financial crisis. Recognizing that flow control
plays an important role in integrated solid waste management and
that it would be inequitable to deny this tool to communities that
have not yet enacted flow control ordinances, the bill also included
procedures for towns to enact new flow control regulations in the
future.
The procedures established by the House bill addressed a number
of criticisms of past flow control ordinances. First, the bill required
competitive bidding for contracts to provide solid waste management
services that incorporate flow control.' Thus, the bill provided a
means of price competition in the solid waste management industry
even with flow control." Second, the bill excluded recyclable
materials from flow control unless voluntarily given to the local
government by the generator, so as not to stifle the market in
recycling. 9 Similarly, the bill prohibited subjecting commercial
solid waste to new flow control ordinances.1 ' This would leave
commercial entities free to find the facility that best meets the
environmental requirements of their waste.
202. H.R. 4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The Senate failed to pass a similar bill.
203. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1988).
204. As discussed above, Congress has the power to authorize states to perform actions that
would otherwise contravene the Commerce Clause. Section 4011(h) of the House Bill states
that, 'Itlhe exercise of flow control authority in compliance with this section by a State or
tualified political subdivision shall itself be considered a reasonable regulation of commerce and
shall not itself be considered as imposing an undue burden -on or otherwise impairing,
restraining, or discriminating against interstate commerce." H.R. 4683, § 4011(h) (1994).
205. Id. § 4011(a)(2).
206. See 140 CONG. REc. H10298-310 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994).
207. H.R. 4683, § 4011(c).
208. 140 CONG. REc. H10302, (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. McMillan).
Under the current prohibition of flow control ordinances, towns have considered collecting
garbage themselves to ensure that waste goes to the designated facility without resorting to flow
control. Ellen Yan, Towns' Trash-Talk, NEWSDAY, May 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Papers File. Such an outcome decreases competition in the waste management industry.
209. H.R. 4683, § 4011(b).
210. Id. § 4011(a)(1). Garbage generated by commercial entities that was subject to flow
control before the Carbone decision may continue to be subject to flow control. Id.
§ 401(a)(2).
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One major criticism of flow control, even under the procedures
mandated by the House bill, is that such ordinances facilitate solid
waste incinerators.2 1 These incinerators, which burn municipal solid
waste to generate energy, require a huge capital investment and a
steady supply of waste to operate efficiently.2" Flow control
ordinances satisfy both these needs by providing the necessary fuel
and by allowing the town to set a tipping fee sufficient to finance the
operation.
Many environmental groups have criticized incinerators out of
concern for the dioxin emissions generated by the process.213
Because they feel that flow control ordinances encourage incineration,
these groups have also opposed flow control regulations.214 The
better solution to these legitimate concerns, however, is stricter
regulation of incinerators, not prohibition of flow control. If used
appropriately, flow control can play -a significant role in facilitating
recycling, household hazardous waste separation, composting, and
other important environmental protection.
Congress should immediately pass legislation similar to House
Bill 4683 to prevent the potentially significant adverse effects of the
Carbone decision. The bill would provide crucial relief to towns that
currently rely on.flow control and would prevent a financial crisis for
these communities. In addition, the bill gives local governments the
tool they need to undertake environmentally sound, comprehensive,
and financially feasible waste management.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Carbone invalidates flow control
ordinances throughout the United States. As a result, local govern-
ments that have relied on flow control. regulations to finance new
waste control facilities now face a financial crisis.215 Without the
revenue provided by flow control, towns may be forced to scale back
their waste management services. Old, inefficient, and unsafe waste
management facilities may continue to be used. Important recycling,
source reduction, and household hazardous waste collection programs
may also have to be eliminated or scaled down. The result will be
211. 140 CONG. REC. H10301 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
212. See Phelps, supra note 180.
213. 140 CONG. R-c. H10301 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson).
214. Id.
215. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
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degradation of environmental quality, or at least a halt to improve-
ments currently being made.
As one town's environmental commissioner has warned, low-cost
private landfills will eventually fill up and close.216 Then, "every-
body's going to be knocking on local government's doors ...
reminding them they have an obligation to take [the garbage]. 217
Beyond these severe impacts on solid waste management,
Carbone's most lasting impact may be on the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine itself In Carbone, the Supreme Court expanded the
virtually per se invalid test by applying it to local laws that have only
an attenuated impact on interstate commerce. As a result, important
local regulations with only minimal impacts on interstate commerce
may be held invalid. The Carbone decision fails to give sufficient
consideration to the states' legitimate authority over health and safety.
In so doing, the Court tramples on state sovereignty. More impor-
tantly, valuable regulations that protect the public welfare may never
be implemented.
216. Phelps, supra note 180 (quoting Peter Scully, environmental commissioner for Islip, New
York). These landfills often lack the significant environmental controls of municipally-affiliated
landfills.
217. Phelps, supra note 180.
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